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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 
Chambers Development Company, Inc., petitions for a 
writ of mandamus following our remand in Chambers 
Development Co., Inc., v. Passaic County Utilities Authority, 
62 F.3d 582 (3d Cir. 1995) ("Chambers I"). Chambers 
argues that mandamus is necessary because the district 
court ignored that mandate. We agree, and will therefore 
grant a writ of mandamus and remand this matter once 




When this matter was initially before us we observed that 
"[t]he parties and the court . . . plunged into a procedural 
miasma which is virtually impenetrable." 621 F.3d at 583. 
The case is now more confused than ever. It has evolved 
from miasma to a jurisprudential Rubik's cube, becoming 
more jumbled at each turn. The dispute arises from a 
breach of contract action between Chambers and Passaic 
County Utilities Authority ("PCUA"). We detailed the 
intricacies leading up to the dispute in Chambers I. We will 
now summarize the background only insofar as is 
necessary to resolve the issues raised by the mandamus 
petition before us. 
 
In 1987, Chambers and PCUA entered into a contract for 
Passaic County's waste disposal. The contract was divided 
into three parts: an Agreement for the Grant and 
Acquisition of a License ("Initial Agreement"); a Long-Term 
Agreement for the Grant and Acquisition of a License for 
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Ash Residue Waste Disposal ("Long-Term Agreement"); and 
an Easement and License Agreement. The Initial Agreement 
governed the rights and duties of the parties from 
December 1, 1987, until December 1, 1992. The Long-Term 
Agreement governs the rights and duties of the parties from 
December 1, 1992 until December 1, 2002. 
 
The Initial Agreement required PCUA to deposit all of its 
municipal solid waste ("MSW") in Chambers' landfills in 
Pennsylvania and required Chambers to reserve airspace 
for up to a maximum of 2.25 million tons of MSW in the 
first five year period. PCUA paid Chambers $51,225,000 in 
advance for its first period disposal rights. Performance of 
the Initial Agreement is not in dispute. 
 
The Long-Term Agreement covered ash residue waste and 
non-processible and bypass solid waste generated by a 
mass burn incinerator or "resource recovery facility" ("RRF") 
that PCUA originally intended to have in place by 1992. 
However, construction of the RRF was not a condition 
precedent to either party's obligations under the Long Term 
Agreement. The Long-Term Agreement also provided that 
Chambers' landfills would serve as the primary disposal 
site for all solid waste for any period in which the RRF was 
not in operation. As it happened, the New Jersey 
Department of Environmental Protection and Energy 
("NJDEPE") disapproved PCUA's proposed construction of 
an RRF and PCUA has no plans to construct one in the 
foreseeable future. However, the only significance of the 
cancellation of the RRF was that Chambers would be 
receiving ordinary MSW rather than receiving ash and by- 
pass waste. 
 
New Jersey's environmental law required that NJDEPE 
approve the contract with Chambers. Accordingly, on June 
24, 1987, Passaic County adopted Plan Amendment 4-1987 
which sought approval of the County's Plan to: 
 
       include the Chambers Development Company, Inc., 
       landfill system in Pennsylvania and other states, to be 
       utilized as primary landfills for the disposal of Passaic 
       County solid waste from 1987 to 1992. In addition, this 
       landfill system is designated under the plan as the 
       primary landfill system for the disposal of ash, bypass 
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       and non-processible waste associated with the 
       operation of the resource recovery facility in the City of 
       Passaic from the time the facility is operational until 
       the year 2002. 
 
On September 1, 1987, the Commissioner of NJDEPE, 
Richard T. Dewling, certified Passaic County's Plan 
Amendment 4-1987 in part (hereinafter "Dewling 
Certification"). Dewling approved the use of Chambers' 
landfills from 1987 through 1992. However, he rejected 
PCUA's plan to rely on Chambers' landfills as the primary 
site for waste disposal between 1992 and 2002 because the 
Plan's dependence on an out-of-state landfill for long-term 
solid waste disposal was contrary to Passaic County's 
obligation to develop in-county facilities for waste disposal. 
 
Commissioner Dewling explained: 
 
       N.J.S.A. 13:1E-21(b)3 places a legal obligation on each 
       district to plan for sufficient available suitable in- 
       county disposal sites. . . . [T]he only solution to the 
       long-term disposal needs of Passaic County is the 
       development of in-county facilities or to secure 
       interdistrict agreement with other New Jersey counties. 
       In light of these factors, and [to] the extent that Passaic 
       County has failed to meet its planning obligations 
       pursuant to N.J.S.A. 13:1E-21(b)3, the Department 
       cannot approve primary dependence upon out-of-state 
       residual disposal capacity for the period 1993 to 2002. 
 
       ****************************** 
 
       Amendment 4-1987 is hereby modified and approved to 
       include within the district plan the designation of the 
       Chambers Development Company, Inc., landfill system 
       to Pennsylvania and other states as a component of 
       Passaic County's contingency plan for the disposal of 
       ash, by-pass and non-processible waste associated 
       with the operation of the Passaic County resource 
       recovery facility from the time the facility is operational 
       until the year 2002. Further, within forty-five days of 
       the date of this certification, Passaic County is directed 
       to submit the remainder of its solid waste contingency 
       plan in plan amendment form for state level review in 
       consideration of the Department's comments of May 7, 
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       1987 concerning the county's draft submission. More 
       specifically, the remainder of the plan should address 
       in-county residual landfill development, the 
       development of interdistrict agreements on an 
       interim/emergency basis, and the identification of 
       alternate land filling options. 
 
From 1987 through 1992, PCUA utilized Chambers' 
landfills as Passaic County's primary solid waste disposal 
site in accordance with the fully approved Initial 
Agreement. Apparently, during most of the period of the 
Initial Agreement, Passaic County never proposed any 
subsequent plan amendment or attempted to remedy the 
deficiency identified by Commissioner Dewling. 
Consequently, PCUA had no in-state primary plan to 
present to NJDEPE despite the approach of the end of the 
Initial Term of the agreement with Chambers. 
 
In early 1992, PCUA began soliciting interest from 
disposal companies including Chambers, for a new 15-year 
disposal agreement which would handle the county's 
municipal waste. In addition, PCUA asked Chambers to 
renegotiate the disposal rates set forth in the Long-Term 
Agreement. Although renegotiations did begin, they proved 
fruitless. 
 
On August 15, 1992, PCUA entered into a Memorandum 
of Understanding ("MOU") with Empire Sanitary Landfill, 
Inc. Under the MOU, PCUA agreed to deliver all Passaic 
County solid waste to Empire's landfill in Eastern 
Pennsylvania for a period of 15 years. The Empire MOU, 
like the prior agreement with Chambers, was subject to the 
review, amendment and approval of NJDEPE. 
 
While the Passaic County Freeholders and PCUA were 
preparing to submit the Empire MOU to NJDEPE, 
Chambers learned of the Empire MOU and filed a complaint 
in the district court for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
seeking to enjoin the PCUA from proceeding with Empire. 
Chambers alleged that the MOU amounted to an 
anticipatory breach by PCUA of the Long Term Agreement 
it had with Chambers. Chambers also alleged that PCUA 
was equitably estopped from entering into a contract with 
Empire. 
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Chambers and PCUA filed cross-motions for summary 
judgment. The PCUA's motion was based on its argument 
that the Dewling Certification was a rejection of the Long- 
Term Agreement and that PCUA was free to explore 
alternative landfill options pursuant to the directive 
contained in Commissioner Dewling's certification. 
 
On November 20, 1992, the district court granted 
summary judgment in favor of Chambers on its anticipatory 
breach of contract claim. The district court held that the 
Long-Term Agreement's validity did not depend upon 
whether the RRF was ever built. It then held: 
 
       Because use of Chambers' landfills is approved as a 
       contingency, and because NJDEPE has approved no 
       other plan for disposal of solid waste in the 1992-2002 
       period, PCUA is obligated both under its Long-Term 
       Agreement and under New Jersey state law to continue 
       to use Chambers' landfills. 
 
(November 11, 1992 Dist. Ct. Opn. at 9). The district court 
noted that no damages for breach had occurred because 
the Long-Term Agreement was not to take effect until 
December 1, 1992, and it granted a permanent injunction, 
with the following caveat: 
 
       This Court cannot and is not attempting, by issuance 
       of a permanent injunction, to bind NJDEPE, which has 
       the statutory duty to regulate the disposal of solid 
       waste in New Jersey. NJDEPE approved the use of 
       Chambers' landfill as a contingency for the period 
       1992-2002 and there is nothing of record to indicate 
       that until November 6, 19921, PCUA has attempted to 
       obtain approval for any other method of disposal. 
       Absent a contrary direction from NJDEPE, Passaic 
       County is bound to honor its contract with Chambers. 2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. November 6, 1992 is the date when PCUA submitted the MOU with 
Empire to NJDEPE for approval. 
 
2. Since the district court clearly stated that its order could not be 
interpreted to bind the NJDEPE to take any action, the doctrine of 
primary jurisdiction is not implicated here. See MCI v. Teleconcepts, 
Inc., 
71 F.3d 1086 (3d. Cir. 1995). 
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Accordingly, the court worded its injunctive order as 
follows: 
       [A] permanent injunction is granted to Plaintiff, 
       Chambers Development Corporation and against 
       Defendant, Passaic County Utilities Authority. Unless 
       and until directed to the contrary by a valid 
       certification of the [NJDEPE], PCUA shall continue 
       operating under the terms and conditions of the Long- 
       Term Agreement for the grant and acquisition of a 
       license of ash residue waste disposal. Provided, 
       however, that nothing in this order shall be construed 
       as restricting any proceeding by any party before 
       NJDEPE seeking approval or disapproval of any 
       primary long-term plan for the disposal of municipal 
       solid waste by PCUA. 
 
The district court entered summary judgment in favor of 
PCUA on Chambers' equitable estoppel claim because 
Chambers could not demonstrate reasonable reliance. 
 
       [A]ny reliance by Chambers on the Long-Term 
       Agreement being the primary solid waste disposal plan 
       for the entire 1992-2002 period is unreasonable. 
       Chambers, as a sophisticated corporation involved in 
       negotiations with two governmental entities, could not 
       rely on the contingent approval of the Long-Term 
       Agreement as the equivalent of primary approval. 
 
Neither party appealed any portion of the district court's 
November 20, 1992 decision. 
 
Before the district court issued its injunction, NJDEPE 
notified PCUA that it had not yet come forward with an in- 
state, primary disposal solution. Commissioner Scott 
Weiner wrote: 
 
       Passaic County currently has no disposal plan in place 
       and the long-term use of out-of-state disposal was 
       authorized only within the context of contingency plan 
       backup use as stated within the Department's 
       September 1, 1987 certification. Therefore, the Passaic 
       County Plan is deficient with respect to N.J.S.A. 13:1E- 
       21(b)3. 
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Despite this reminder that it was not in compliance with 
the requirement for an in-state disposal facility, PCUA 
submitted the Empire MOU to NJDEPE for review and 
approval on November 6, 1992. On December 7, 1992, the 
Commissioner of NJDEPE formally ordered PCUA to: 
 
       Submit to the Department all supporting documents 
       with respect to its proposed plan certification including 
       the Memorandum of Understanding and contract with 
       Empire as well as the long-term disposal strategy 
       previously required by the Department's September 11, 
       1992 Plan Certification and any other justifications to 
       support this contract by January 9, 1992. 
 
On the same day, the Commissioner extended the 
Chambers arrangement for one year until the regulatory 
process was completed, and PCUA executed a contract with 
Empire. 
 
On or about December 4, 1992, Chambers filed an 
application for post judgment relief with the district court 
seeking a temporary restraining order against PCUA's 
approval of a contract with Empire. In an Order, dated 
February 1, 1993, the district court denied the restraining 
order, but indicated that it would entertain a motion 
seeking the revocation of PCUA's action or another remedy. 
While Chambers was proceeding on its "post-judgment" 
actions, PCUA was proceeding with the approval process 
with NJDEPE for the Empire Contract. On December 17, 
1992, Passaic County submitted a Verified Petition to 
NJDEPE seeking approval of Empire as Passaic County's 
primary disposal plan. In seeking that approval, PCUA took 
the position that Commissioner's Dewling Certification 
approved Chambers "only as a contingency plan in the 
absence of any other disposal strategy approved by the 
DEP." 
 
On April 8, 1993, NJDEPE agreed to review the Empire 
arrangement, contingent upon PCUA also submitting a 
long-term, in-state disposal plan. On August 20, 1993, 
PCUA participated in a status conference with the then 
Acting Commissioner of NJDEPE, Jeanne M. Fox. At that 
conference, PCUA stated that "[t]here is no existing out-of- 
state contract [with Chambers] and that fact has been 
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recognized by Passaic County in its submission of this new 
plan." 
 
On October 7, 1993, Commissioner Fox approved PCUA's 
proposal to designate Empire's out-of-state landfill as 
Passaic County's primary disposal mechanism. In 
approving the Empire arrangement, Commissioner Fox 
stated: "In comparison to the Chambers' Agreement, the 
Empire Agreement offers significant savings in the form of 
avoided costs for the transportation and disposal of 
municipal waste." The Commissioner also wrote that the 
Chambers-PCUA Long-Term Agreement "was merely a 
contingent arrangement which, for Department purposes, 
never took effect." Nonetheless, the Commissioner did 
indicate that the Long-Term Agreement was not a 
completely dead issue. She wrote: "If . . . legislation is 
imposed which renders the Empire Agreement void or 
voidable, the Chambers Long-Term Agreement contingency 
plan can be activated, pending the institution of the in- 
state long-term disposal solution." 
 
Chambers did not seek to have PCUA's contract with 
Empire rescinded as suggested in the district court's 
February 1, 1993, Order. Instead, Chambers filed a 
supplement to the previous summary judgment motion 
contending that execution of the MOU and contract with 
Empire constituted an actual, rather than an anticipatory, 
breach of contract and a breach of the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing. Chambers argued that the law of the 
case was that the Long-Term Agreement had been declared 
a binding and enforceable contract and that in order to 
comply with the district court's order, PCUA was required 
to seek approval of the Chambers-PCUA Agreement, not 
present a competing contract to NJDEPE for approval. This 
time Chambers sought damages in the amount of its 
expected lost profits from the balance of the Chambers- 
PCUA contract. 
 
PCUA responded that the Initial Agreement was the law 
of the case as it was the only plan approved by NJDEPE, 
and the district court's order gave it the right to seek 
NJDEPE approval of the Empire plan. 
 
The matter was referred to a magistrate judge whofiled 
a Report and Recommendation in which he recommended 
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that Chambers' motion for summary judgment be denied 
and that summary judgment be granted in favor of PCUA 
even though PCUA never moved for summary judgment. 
 
On June 29, 1994, the district court adopted the Report 
and Recommendation of the magistrate judge. However, 
while adopting the magistrate's report and 
recommendation, the district court wrote: 
 
       [I]f there were evidence in the record to support 
       Chambers' . . . assertion that "[PCUA], as late as 1992 
       indicated that the contract would be performed on a 
       long-term basis". . . I would find that New Jersey 
       precedent on the scope of the duty of good faith 
       required a hearing into whether the [PCUA] breached a 
       duty of good faith performance of its contract with 
       Chambers. 
 
Chambers responded to this statement by filing a motion 
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) seeking to amend the judgment 
so as to order an evidentiary hearing on the duty of good 
faith performance. That motion was denied on July 19, 




In Chambers I, a panel of this court unanimously 
concluded that the district court's grant of summary 
judgment to PCUA was improper because PCUA had never 
moved for summary judgment. Id. at 584. The panel 
majority also agreed that "there are unresolved material 
issues of fact regarding [PCUA's] obligations under the 
Chambers unaltered and unrescinded long-term agreement 
which can only be resolved by an evidentiary hearing." Id. 
at 588. The majority noted that, while the long-term 
agreement did not expressly state that it was subject to the 
approval of NJDEPE, it nonetheless could not be 
implemented unless NJDEPE approved PCUA's amended 
plan. Id. Since NJDEPE did not approve PCUA's plan "in 
toto", the Dewling Certification was "enigmatic" and "left the 
meaning of the Chambers Long-Term Agreement 
susceptible to more than one interpretation." Id. 
Accordingly, we vacated the district court's grant of 
summary judgment and remanded "for further proceedings 
 
                                10 
  
consistent with this opinion, with the privilege to Chambers 
to amend its complaint to enable it to present the case in 
its current status." Id., at 589. In doing so, we instructed 
the district court as follows: 
 
       On remand, the district court should first determine 
       the effect of the [Dewling Certification] on the 
       Chambers long-term agreement. In connection, it 
       should ascertain whether the Authority evinced an 
       understanding that the Chambers long-term agreement 
       was still binding by commissioning the 1991 Alaimo 
       report and other similar reports.3 It should also 
       determine as a fact that the Authority's purpose in 
       filing its complaint in the New Jersey State Court and 
       whether it supported Chambers' contention that it and 
       the Authority knew they had a binding contract in 
       place, subject only to the Authority's compliance with 
       [NJDEPE] certification.4 Finally, the court must 
       factually determine whether the Authority was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. According to Chambers, PCUA required that Chambers formally 
certify, on an annual basis, that its facilities could accommodate the 
volume of solid waste contemplated by the full fifteen-year term of the 
contract. Chambers claims that it has done so. In any event, in 1991, 
PCUA challenged the certifications and an independent consultant, 
Alaimo Engineering, was retained to perform a study. The report sought 
to determine the capacity of the Chambers landfills. The Report was 
prepared for PCUA and it clearly shows that it covered the time period 
from 1987 to 2002, the time period of both the Initial Agreement and the 
Long-Term Agreement. Chambers argued that the Alaimo report 
demonstrates that PCUA expected to use Chambers for waste disposal 
after the short-term contract expired. PCUA did not address this 
argument in the appeal. 
 
4. In September, 1992, PCUA filed a state court declaratory judgment 
action, naming as defendants Chambers, Empire and NJDEPE, seeking 
a declaration that it is not liable to perform under the contract after 
1992 if such performance is due to the existence of a later-approved 
primary disposal alternative; declaring that PCUA may terminate its 
contract with Chambers upon payment of damages in accordance with 
section 9.3 of the contract; and restraining Chambers from interfering 
with PCUA's obligation to secure contractual arrangements to provide 
safe, adequate and economical services to its ratepayers and citizens. 
Chambers argued that this action demonstrates that PCUA believed that 
its contract with Chambers was valid and enforceable. 
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       attempting to disengage itself from obligations under 
       its long-term contract with Chambers because in 1992 
       it could secure a contract with Empire at better prices 
       and whether it violated the covenant of good faith and 






On remand, Chambers filed a two count amended 
complaint per our opinion. App. at 26-40. Count One 
alleged that the Dewling Certification directed PCUA to 
identify a New Jersey disposal facility by 1992 and 
approved Chambers as the contingent alternative in the 
event PCUA failed to identify an in-state disposal facility. 
Chambers averred that, by choosing to perform with these 
qualifications, PCUA assumed a contractual obligation to 
use Chambers as the exclusive out-of-state alternative. 
Count Two alleged that PCUA breached the duty of good 
faith and fair dealing by convincing NJDEPE to approve the 
Empire contract, thus destroying the fruits of the 
Chambers-PCUA contract. 
 
PCUA eventually filed a motion for summary judgment in 
which it argued that Chambers' amended complaint must 
be dismissed on the basis of judicial estoppel. The judicial 
estoppel argument had two facets. PCUA first argued that 
Chambers had asserted inconsistent positions in two 
separate lawsuits. In a lawsuit against another utility 
authority involving a Chambers competitor, Chambers had 
argued that the contract in question was invalid because it 
was made in the absence of public bidding.5 The Chambers- 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. According to PCUA, in January of 1994, Chambers began suit against 
a competitor, Waste Management of Pennsylvania, Inc., in New Jersey 
state court, seeking to invalidate a long-term ash disposal contract 
between Waste Management and the Essex County Utilities Authority. 
Chambers contended that under New Jersey law, county utility 
authorities are required to adhere to public-bidding procedures in 
awarding any long-term ash disposal contracts. Thus, argued Chambers, 
because the Essex County-Waste Management contract was awarded 
without public bidding, it was illegal and void. Chambers prevailed in the 
trial court and the parties ultimately agreed to dismiss an appeal filed 
with the New Jersey appellate court. 
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PCUA contract was also reached without public bidding, 
and PCUA asserted that Chambers should therefore be 
judicially estopped from asserting the validity of its 
"contract" with PCUA. Second, PCUA argued that the 
amended complaint should be dismissed because 
Chambers had represented that it was not seeking 
interpretation of the Dewling Certification in an earlier 
phase in the lawsuit. PCUA argued that Count One of 
Chambers' amended complaint did exactly that and it 
should therefore be dismissed. 
 
The summary judgment motion was referred to the 
magistrate judge, who recommended that Count One of the 
amended complaint be dismissed under the doctrine of 
judicial estoppel. He concluded that Chambers had 
previously represented that it was not seeking to have the 
court interpret the Dewling Certification, but that 
Chambers' amended complaint sought just such an 
interpretation. Id. at 7-8. The magistrate judge rejected the 
first judicial estoppel argument, because the validity of the 
agreement had already been established by the district 
court and was thus the law of the case. 
 
However, the magistrate judge went even further. He 
ruled that Count One should be dismissed "as barred by 
the plain meaning of the 1987 certification." Id. at 8 n.7. 
The magistrate judge opined that the Dewling Certification 
"did not give Chambers an exclusive contract in the 1992- 
2002 period" as the out-of-state alternative. Id., at 3 n.2. 
 
The district court adopted the Report and 
Recommendation as its opinion and entered an order 
dismissing Count One of the amended complaint. As a 
result, only the breach of good faith claim asserted in 
Count Two remained. Thereafter, the district court denied 
requests by both Chambers and PCUA to certify the matter 
for immediate interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1292(b). Once again, the district court referred the matter 
to the magistrate judge, who recommended that 
certification be denied, and reiterated his view that the 
"plain meaning of the Dewling Certification precludes the 
claim asserted in Count One." February 11, 1997 Report 
and Recommendation at 1. He stated: 
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       Neither side sets forth any evidence they have obtained 
       in discovery, evidence they have sought in discovery, or 
       any suggestion as to what evidence might exist that 
       would allow a court to construe Dewling's certification 
       in any manner other than by examining the four 




This Report and Recommendation was also adopted by 
the district court. Thereafter, Chambers filed this petition 
for mandamus, asserting that the district court's holding 
that the "plain meaning of the Dewling Certification" 
precludes its breach of contract action ignored our mandate 




We have authority to issue writs of mandamus pursuant 
to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. S 1651(a). Hahnemann 
University Hospital v. Edgar, 74 F.3d 456, 460 (3d Cir. 
1996). That Act states "[t]he Supreme Court and all courts 
established by Act of Congress may issue all writs 
necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective 
jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of 
law." 28 U.S.C. S 1651(a). Traditionally, the writ of 
mandamus has been used "to confine an inferior court to a 
lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it 
to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so." Will v. 
Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 661 (1978). The writ is 
a drastic remedy that "is seldom issued and its use is 
discouraged." Lusardi v. Lechner, 855 F.2d 1062, 1069 (3d 
Cir. 1988). Moreover, it is within a court's discretion to 
refrain from issuing the writ even when the requirements 
for mandamus are technically satisfied. The availability of 
the writ "does not compel its exercise." Id. at 1070. 
 
       The writ of mandamus is a drastic remedy that a court 
       should grant only in extraordinary circumstances in 
       response to an act amounting to a judicial usurpation 
       of power. Given its drastic nature, a writ of mandamus 
       should not be issued where relief may be obtained 
       through an ordinary appeal. Thus, in addition to the 
       jurisdictional prerequisite inherent in the language of 
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       section 1651(a),6 two additional prerequisites for 
       issuance of a writ are: (1) that petitioner have no other 
       adequate means to attain the desired relief, and (2) 
       that petitioner meets its burden of showing that its 
       right to the writ is clear and indisputable. Even when 
       these prerequisites are met, issuance of the writ is 
       largely discretionary, bearing in mind the unfortunate 
       consequence of making the judge a litigant.7 
 
Hahnemann University Hospital v. Edgar, 74 F.3d at 462 
(citations and internal quotations omitted). 
 
Nonetheless, in appropriate circumstances, the issuance 
of the writ is the "obvious" remedy. Blasband v. Rales, 979 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Under the All Writs Act, the writ of mandamus can be issued where 
"necessary or appropriate in aid of [the court's] jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. 
S 1651(a). However, to satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisite, it is not 
necessary that the action in which the writ is sought be pending in the 
court asked to issue the writ. United States v. Christian, 660 F.2d 892, 
894 (3d Cir. 1981). Rather, it is only required that the case may at some 
future time come within the court's appellate jurisdiction. Id. Here, the 
district court has diversity jurisdiction over the underlying breach of 
contract action and, therefore, this court "potentially has jurisdiction 
over the case and therefore has jurisdiction under the All Writs Act to 
consider" Chambers' petition for a writ of mandamus. Hahnemann 
University Hospital v. Edgar, 74 F.3d at 460. 
 
7. The "unfortunate consequence of making the judge a litigant" is no 
longer a factor to be considered in exercising our discretion whether to 
grant the writ. The 1996 amendments to Fed. R. App. P. 21 eliminated 
the role of the district court judge as a respondent. The Advisory 
Committee Notes to the 1996 amendments provide: 
 
       In most instances, a writ of mandamus . . . is not actually 
       directed to a judge in a more personal way than is an order 
       reversing a court's judgment. Most often a petition for a writ of 
       mandamus seeks review of the intrinsic merits of a judge's action 
       and is in reality an adversary proceeding between the parties. See, 
       e.g., Walter v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 443 F.2d 33 
(7th 
       Cir. 1971). In order to change the tone of the rule and of mandamus 
       proceedings generally, the rule is amended so that the judge is not 
       treated as a respondent. 
 
However, the court of appeals can "invite or order the trial judge to 
respond," and the trial judge "may request permission to respond. . . ." 
Fed. R. App. P. 21(b)(4). 
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F.2d 324, 328 (3d Cir. 1992). For example, mandamus is 
appropriate when a district court has failed to adhere to the 
mandate of an appellate court.8Id.; see also Delgrosso v. 
Spang & Co., 903 F.2d 234, 237 (3d Cir. 1990); Citibank, 
N.A. v. Fullam, 580 F.2d 82, 86-87 (3d Cir. 1978). Appellate 
courts "have uniformly granted such writs where .. . the 
district court has failed to adhere to an order of the court 
of appeals." Citibank, N.A. v. Fullam, 580 F.2d at 86-87. 
 
       A federal district court has a clear duty to comply 
       with an order decreed by a panel of this circuit. Where 
       the district court has failed to comply with such an 
       order, we have authority under S 1651 to issue a writ of 
       mandamus to compel the district court to follow our 
       previous order. Any other rule would severely jeopardize 
       the supervisory role of the courts of appeals within the 
       federal judicial system. 
 
Id. Moreover, district courts "must implement both the 
letter and spirit of the mandate, taking into account [our] 
opinion and the circumstances it embraces." Delgrosso v. 
Spang & Co., 903 F.2d at 240. When we direct the district 
court "to act in accordance with [our] opinion . . . the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The mandate of an appellate court establishes the law binding further 
action in the litigation by another body subject to its authority. Finberg 
v. Sullivan, 658 F.2d 93, 97 n.5 (3d Cir. 1981) (citation and internal 
quotations omitted). Functionally, the mandate is"the formal vehicle for 
conveying the terms of our disposition to the District Court." Clarke v. 
United States, 915 F.2d 699, 716 (D.C. Cir. 1990). As a procedural 
matter, the mandate is issued by the Clerk of Court and usually consists 
of a certified copy of the judgment, a certified copy of the opinion of 
the 
court, if any, and any directions as to costs. Fed. R. App. P. 41(a). 
Thus, 
the issuance of the mandate "is largely a ministerial function," Finberg 
v. Sullivan, 658 F.2d at 97 n.5, that follows automatically 7 days after 
the expiration of the time for filing of a petition for rehearing, unless 
stayed. Fed. R. App. P. 41(a). As a practical matter, "[f]or most 
purposes, 
the entry of judgment, rather than the issuance of the mandate, marks 
the effective end to a controversy on appeal." Finberg, at 97 n.5; see 
also 
Clarke v. United States, 915 F.2d at 716 ("[O]ur issuance of the mandate 
is wholly separate from our consideration of the merits. . . ."). 
Therefore, 
"our circuit recognizes the minimal role a court ordinarily plays between 
the filing of a decision and the issuance of a mandate." Humphreys v. 
Drug Enforcement Administration, 105 F.3d 112, 117 (3d Cir. 1996). 
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opinion becomes part of the mandate and must be 
considered together with it." Id. 
 
Here, on remand, the district court held that the"plain 
meaning" of the Dewling Certification precludes Chambers' 
breach of contract claim. As noted above, in Chambers I, we 
held that the Dewling Certification "left the meaning of the 
Chambers long-term contract susceptible to more than one 
interpretation." Chambers, 62 F.3d at 588. To illustrate the 
ambiguity in the Certification we posed the following query: 
 
       Did the certification mean that the Chambers contract 
       would be effective in all its terms in the event PCUA 
       failed to develop in-state waste disposal options? Or 
       did it mean the certification effectively rendered the 
       long-term agreement a nullity permitting it to be 
       replaced at the will and whimsy of the Authority? This 
       ambiguity creates questions of fact susceptible to more 
       than one meaning which preclude summary judgment. 
       Therefore, extrinsic evidence that objectively will 
       illuminate its meaning, especially the conduct of the 
       parties, will be helpful. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). We instructed the district on remand 
to "first determine the effect of the [Dewling Certification] on 
the Chambers long-term agreement" and to "ascertain 
whether the [PCUA] evinced an understanding that the 
Chambers long-term agreement was still binding by 
commissioning the 1991 Alaimo report and other similar 
reports." Id. at 589. It should be obvious that, had we 
concluded that the contract could be enforced as a matter 
of law with no extrinsic evidence as to intent, we would not 
have held as we did. On the contrary, we determined that 
the Dewling Certification was ambiguous and that extrinsic 
evidence was necessary to determine its meaning insofar as 
the Long Term Agreement between Chambers and PCUA 
was concerned. Despite that holding, the district court 
ruled that the "four corners of the [Dewling] certification," 
were so clear as to bar Chambers' breach of contract claim 
as a matter of law. That holding is so clearly contrary to 
our mandate that very little further discussion is required. 
Thus, in the usual situation, we could end our analysis 
having concluded that the district court ignored both the 
letter and spirit of our mandate. 
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This is not, however, the usual situation, and we must go 
further if we are to properly align the facts in this "cube." 
The district court dismissed the breach of contract action 
on the alternative theory of judicial estoppel. In fact, the 
Report and Recommendation that the district court adopted 
relied almost exclusively upon that doctrine to justify the 
dismissal of Count One. The magistrate judge stated: 
 
       PCUA is correct in asserting that judicial estoppel 
       requires dismissal of Count One of the Amended 
       Complaint on grounds other than Chambers' assertion 
       in New Jersey state court that solid waste disposal 
       contracts require public bidding. To avoid dismissal or 
       transfer of this matter, Chambers represented to the 
       Court that it was not seeking interpretation of 
       Commissioner Dewling's 1987 certification of the Short- 
       Term Agreement and contingent approval of the Long- 
       Term Agreement in a manner that would obstruct the 
       NJDEPE from determining where Passaic County's solid 
       waste should go in the 1992-2002 period. Count One of 
       the Amended Complaint asks exactly that. Chambers 
       should be held bound by its representations, and the 
       Court should dismiss Count One of the Amended 
       Complaint. 
 
December 11, 1996 Report and Recommendation at 7-8. 
The magistrate judge's erroneous conclusion that the 
Dewling Certification could be enforced as a matter of law 
was discussed in only two footnotes. See Id. at 3 n.2 and 8 
n.7; see also February 11, 1997 Report and 
Recommendation at 1. 
 
It is "axiomatic" that, on remand for further proceedings, 
the "trial court must proceed in accordance with the 
mandate and law of the case as established on appeal." 
Bankers Trust Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 761 F.2d 943, 
949 (3d Cir. 1985). However, our mandate does not prohibit 
the district court from considering new issues raised after 
remand. A district court "may consider, as a matter of first 
impression, those issues not expressly or implicitly 
disposed of by the appellate decision." Id. at 950. Therefore 
the district court was "free to make any order or direction 
in further progress of the case, not inconsistent with [our] 
decision . . . as to any question not settled by the decision" 
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on remand. Id. The doctrine of judicial estoppel was only 
asserted after our remand. Nevertheless, Chambers argues 
that the district court's ruling on judicial estoppel is 
inconsistent with our mandate and that we can therefore 
address the merits of that decision under our mandamus 
jurisdiction. Chambers' Br. at 30-32. Chambers relies upon 
the following language from Chambers I: 
 
       The concurrence attaches some significance to DEP's 
       1993 approval of the Empire contract. This approval 
       had no effect on the Authority's obligations under the 
       Chambers long-term contract. DEP's approval of the 
       Empire contract signifies only that the Empire contract 
       conforms to the New Jersey waste disposal plan. 
 
Chambers, 62 F.3d at 588 n.13. In contrast, the district 
court adopted the following statement of the magistrate 
judge: 
 
       For a Court to tell a party that despite the real world 
       approval of the Empire Agreement by the NJDEPE the 
       NJDEPE is judicially deemed to have approved 
       Chambers interferes with the validity of the operations 
       of the NJDEPE every bit as much as injunctive relief, 
       since it essentially tells the solid waste authorities that 
       NJDEPE certification is worthless unless approved by 
       the court. 
 
December 11, 1996, Report and Recommendation, at 8 n.8. 
Chambers now argues that this statement is inconsistent 
with our conclusion that its breach of contract claim does 
not interfere with NJDEPE's approval of the PCUA-Empire 
contract. However, we can not address Chambers' 





Our jurisdiction to review the propriety of the district 
court's grant of summary judgment on a petition for a writ 
of mandamus is a difficult question. Since the court 
granted summary judgment on Count One of Chambers' 
amended complaint, Count Two (breach of good faith and 
fair dealing) remains. Mandamus is an appellate power, 
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that is "realistically a form of interlocutory appeal," Martin 
v. United States, 96 F.3d 853, 854 (7th Cir. 1996). However, 
it is "different in kind from an appeal." Madden v. Myers, 
102 F.3d 74,77 (3d Cir. 1996). Mandamus "constitutes a 
procedural mechanism through which a court of appeals 
reviews a carefully circumscribed and discrete category of 
district court orders." Id. In distinguishing between 
mandamus and appellate jurisdiction, we have said: 
 
       The practical difference between appellate jurisdiction 
       and mandamus jurisdiction is the standard of review. 
       Our standard of review under mandamus jurisdiction 
       is exceedingly narrow; our standard of review under 
       appellate jurisdiction varies depending on the issue 
       that we are called upon to review. Accordingly, 
       mandamus jurisdiction affords an appellate court less 
       opportunity to correct district court error in the case 
       before it and less opportunity to provide guidance for 
       future cases. Moreover, comity between the district and 
       appellate courts is best served by resort to mandamus 
       only in limited circumstances. Review under appellate 
       jurisdiction is therefore preferable to review under 
       mandamus jurisdiction. 
 
In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 964 (3d Cir. 
1997)(citation omitted). Thus, mandamus is not a 
substitute for appeal and a writ of mandamus will not be 
granted if relief can be obtained by way of our appellate 
jurisdiction. Id. at 957. Mandamus is "disfavored because 
its broad use would threaten the [congressional] policy 
against piecemeal appeals." In re School Asbestos Litigation, 
977 F.2d 764, 772 (3d Cir. 1992)(citing Kerr v. United 
States District Court, 426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976). 9 Here, the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. For example, discovery orders are generally not appealable, Smith v. 
BIC Corp., 869 F.2d 194, 198 (3d Cir. 1989). Therefore, mandamus is 
the appropriate jurisdictional vehicle to review disclosure of documents 
and information when privilege is asserted. See Rohne-Poulenc Rorer Inc. 
v. Home Indemnity Co., 32 F.3d 851, 861 (3d Cir. 1994) (discussing 
privilege or other interests of confidentiality); Haines v. Liggett Group, 
Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 89 (3d Cir. 1992) (discussing attorney-client privilege 
and work product doctrine protections); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. 
Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1422 (3d Cir. 1991)(same); 
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grant of summary judgment was interlocutory and notfinal 
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. S 1291. See Communication 
Workers of America, AFL-CIO v. American Telephone & 
Telegraph Co., 932 F.2d 199, 205 (3d Cir. 1991) ("[A] 
decision is final within section 1291 when it ends the 
litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to 
do but execute the judgment.").10 Further, the district court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Sprock v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312, 314-15 (3d Cir. 1985)(discussing work 
product doctrine protections); Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 738 F.2d 587, 
591 (3d Cir. 1984)(same); see also Hahnemann Univ., 74 F.3d at 461 
(discussing possible mandamus jurisdiction to review claim that 
documents were protected by, inter alia, a state law psychotherapist- 
patient privilege); Glenmede Trust Co. v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476, 483-84 
(3d Cir. 1995) (discussing mandamus jurisdiction over review of terms of 
a protective order); Smith v. BIC Corp., 869 F.2d at 198-99 (discussing 
the collateral order doctrine in the context of a review of a claim that 
disputed documents contained trade secrets requiring protection); 
Cippolone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 822 F.2d 335, 340 (3d Cir. 1987) 
(discussing mandamus jurisdiction over review of a protective order). 
 
We have exercised mandamus jurisdiction over privilege and work 
product issues because we have found that "appealing [those] issues 
after final judgment is ineffective," In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d at 
962, 
for the simple and obvious reason that "compliance with the production 
orders . . . destroys the right sought to be protected." Bogosian, 738 
F.2d 
at 591. In other words, mandamus review is appropriate because, 
without it, the petitioner has no other remedy. 
 
Recently, we have adopted the view that we do have appellate 
jurisdiction over attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine 
protection issues under the collateral order doctrine. In re Ford Motor 
Co., at 964. Nonetheless, our decision in Ford Motor Co. makes it clear 
that mandamus remains an appropriate jurisdictional mechanism to 
review orders compelling the disclosure of privileged and confidential 
information. Id.; see also Smith v. BIC Corp., 869 F.2d at 198 (holding 
that discovery orders can, assuming the respective requirements are 
met, be reviewed either under the collateral order doctrine or by way of 
a petition for a writ of mandamus). 
 
10. Both Chambers and PCUA agree that Count Two of the amended 
complaint remains outstanding. Nonetheless, we have a conceptual 
problem in understanding how a count alleging a breach of good faith 
and fair dealing, which is inherent in the contract claim, can survive a 
finding that the breach of contract claim is barred by the plain meaning 
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declined to certify the summary judgment order as to Count 
One for immediate interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 1292(b). The district court's order dismissing 
Count One is not a collateral order under Cohen v. 
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), and 
its progeny.11 Moreover, Chambers has an adequate 
remedy. It can seek appellate review of the judicial estoppel 
ruling when Count Two is finally adjudicated. The only 
consequence of our refusal to review the dismissal of Count 
One now is that Chambers will incur further expense and 
delay if it were to prevail in an appeal of the judicial 
estoppel ruling following resolution of Count Two. We have 
never rested the exercise of our jurisdiction upon such 
inconvenience. Standing alone, Chambers' inconvenience 
does not justify our review of the summary judgment 
decision on a petition for mandamus. Mandamus is 
generally an inappropriate vehicle to review the district 
court's denial of a summary judgment motion because the 
litigation continues. Communication Workers of America, 
932 F.2d at 210. 
 
Admittedly, Chambers faces the reverse of the situation 
faced by the petitioner in Communication Workers. 
Chambers seeks mandamus relief from an order granting 
summary judgment to PCUA on one of its claims, while the 
petitioner in Communication Workers, sought review of an 
order denying its motion for summary judgment. However, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
of the Dewling Certification and by judicial estoppel. The obligation to 
deal in good faith arises out of the underlying contract. Thus, if the 
breach of the underlying contract claim no longer survives, we are at a 
loss to understand how the duty to deal in good faith survives 
independently of the breach of contract action. However, Chambers does 
not argue that this dismissal of Count One was tantamount to a final 
order dismissing the entire contract action. Thus, we do not consider 
this conceptual problem here. 
 
11. The collateral order doctrine "provides a narrow exception to the 
general rule permitting appellate review only offinal orders. An appeal of 
a nonfinal order will lie if (1) the order from which the appellant 
appeals 
conclusively determines the disputed question; (2) the order resolves an 
important issue that is completely separate from the merits of the 
dispute; and (3) the order is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a 
final judgment." In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 958 (3d Cir. 1997). 
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for purposes of our jurisdictional analysis here, that is a 
distinction without a difference. The order before us, and 
the one at issue in Communication Workers, are both 
interlocutory in nature. Hence, the general policy against 
granting mandamus review to an order denying a motion 
for summary judgment applies with equal force here. 
Normal appellate review is available upon the completion of 
this litigation. 
 
We did review a district court's denial of a summary 
judgment motion in a petition for mandamus in In re 
Asbestos School Litigation, 46 F.3d 1284 (3d Cir. 1994). 
There, petitioner asserted that the district court's denial of 
its motion for partial summary judgment "has caused and 
is continuing to cause irreparable harm to its First 
Amendment rights." Id. at 1286. We relied upon N.A.A.C.P. 
v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982), to hold 
that the petitioner could not, "consistent with the First 
Amendment," be held liable. Id. Accordingly, we held that 
the district court's denial of Pfizer's partial summary 
judgment motion was "clearly in error," and found that the 
issuance of a writ of mandamus was "appropriate to 
prevent the harm to First Amendment rights that would 
occur if review . . . had to wait until a final judgment" is 
entered. Id. 
 
Chambers does not, and cannot, claim that any 
constitutional right is being impaired by the district court's 
judicial estoppel decision. Thus, the extraordinary 
circumstances present in In re Asbestos School Litigation 
are not present here. In fact, in In re Asbestos School 
Litigation we reaffirmed our general rule that mandamus is 
not the appropriate mechanism for review of a district 
court's denial of a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 
1295. We expressly noted Asbestos School Litigation was 
"dramatically different" from Communication Workers 
because in Communication Workers, our refusal to subject 
the denial of the summary judgment motion to mandamus 
review merely required AT&T to go to trial, while in 
Asbestos School Litigation, a refusal to grant mandamus 
review "would subject [petitioner] to a continuing 
impairment of its First Amendment freedoms." Id. 
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Nevertheless, despite our narrow scope of review under 
mandamus, and despite the interlocutory nature of the 
district court's judicial estoppel ruling, we conclude that it 
is both appropriate and necessary that we address the 
propriety of the district court's judicial estoppel ruling now 
because that issue is an intrinsic component of the 
question that is properly before us on the mandamus 
petition. See Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 110 
(1964). In Schlagenhauf, the Court approved the use of 
mandamus to decide the "basic, undecided" question of 
whether a district court could order the mental and 
physical examination of a defendant under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
35(a). At the time of that decision, Rule 35(a) provided as 
follows: 
 
       In an action in which the mental or physical condition 
       of a party is in controversy, the court in which the 
       action is pending may order him to submit to a 
       physical or mental examination by a physician. The 
       order may be made only on motion for good cause and 
       upon notice to the party to be examined and to all 
       other parties and shall specify the time, place, manner, 
       conditions, and scope of the examination and the 
       person or persons by whom it is to be made. 
 
Id. at 106. 
 
Schlagenhauf was the driver of a bus and was named as 
one of a number of defendants in a diversity personal injury 
action in which passengers sought damages for injuries 
they sustained when the bus collided with the rear of a 
tractor-trailer. Upon a motion of the plaintiffs, the district 
court ordered Schlagenhauf to submit to mental and 
physical examinations. Schlagenhauf applied to the court of 
appeals for a writ of mandamus against the district court 
judge, seeking to have the order set aside. The court of 
appeals held that its mandamus power allowed it to decide 
whether a district court had the power to order a defendant 
to submit to a mental and physical examination. Id. In 
addition, the court of appeals examined the "in controversy" 
requirement of Rule 35 and determined it adversely to 
Schlagenhauf. However, the court held that it did not have 
the power to determine the "good cause" requirement of 
Rule 35, because it believed that it was not appropriate to 
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review that question on a petition for mandamus. Id. 
Therefore, the court of appeals declined to issue the writ of 
mandamus. 
 
The Supreme Court concluded that the court of appeals 
could exercise mandamus review over the question of 
whether "good cause" had been shown for the examination 
though that question was not ordinarily within the scope of 
mandamus review. Id. at 111. The Court held that the 
"good cause" question was proper for mandamus review at 
that time because it was part of a case brought before the 
Court "on a substantial allegation of usurpation of power in 
ordering any examination of a defendant," and, therefore, 
should have been decided by the appellate court. Id. In 
short, the Court found that "the Court of Appeals had 
power to determine all of the issues presented by the 
petition for mandamus." Id. Indeed, the Court found that 
the court of appeals should have determined the"good 
cause" issue in order, not only to settle "new and important 
problems," but also "so as to avoid piecemeal litigation." Id. 
 
Although Schlagenhauf is not "on all fours" with the 
circumstances before us, it is instructive. Here, the district 
court's judicial estoppel holding is so tethered to its 
disregard of our mandate that we can not remedy the latter 
without addressing the former. See 16 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, 
ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE S 3934 (2d ed. 1996). As we discuss below, our 
mandate left no room for judicial estoppel as applied by the 
district court on remand. Accordingly, failure to address the 
propriety of the district court's judicial estoppel rationale 
would reduce the mandate we issued in Chambers I  to a 
nullity and jumble this "cube" yet again with another turn 
in the wrong direction. Moreover, since the judicial estoppel 
issue would undoubtedly come before us after Count Two is 
resolved, we face the prospect that we will have these same 
parties before us for a third time, arguing an issue that is 
implicit in the mandamus petition now before us. See 
Schlagenhauf, 379 U.S. at 110 (special circumstances can 
extend mandamus power in order to avoid piecemeal 
litigation and resolve "new and important problems"). 
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       Judicial estoppel, sometimes called the doctrine 
       against the assertion of inconsistent positions, is a 
       judge-made doctrine that seeks to prevent a litigant 
       from asserting a position inconsistent with one that she 
       has previously asserted in the same or in a previous 
       proceeding. It is not intended to eliminate all 
       inconsistencies, however slight or inadvertent; rather, it 
       is designed to prevent litigants from playing fast and 
       loose with the courts. 
 
Ryan Operations, G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 
F.3d 355, 358 (3d Cir. 1996) (citations and internal 
quotations omitted).13 The party asserting the estoppel is 
not required to demonstrate detrimental reliance upon the 
prior representation. Id. at 360. In addition, the party to be 
estopped need not have benefited from its earlier position. 
Id. at 361. However, the doctrine will not apply where 
inconsistent positions are asserted in good faith or through 
inadvertence. 
 
       Asserting inconsistent positions does not trigger the 
       application of judicial estoppel unless intentional self- 
       contradiction is used as a means of obtaining unfair 
       advantage. Thus, the doctrine of judicial estoppel does 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Our review of the district court's grant of summary judgment is 
plenary. Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S. Ct. 165 (1995). We note that our standard 
of review here does not contravene the general policy that mandamus is 
not the appropriate jurisdictional method to review a district court 
decision based on the exercise of discretion. United States v. Christian, 
660 F.2d 892, 896 (3d Cir. 1981). 
 
13. In Ryan Operations, G.P., one member of the panel noted that there 
is, apparently, a question as to whether state judicial estoppel law or 
federal judicial estoppel law applies in a diversity action. Here, the 
magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation recites that the New 
Jersey and the federal judicial estoppel rules are consistent. December 
11, 1996 Report and Recommendation, at 5 n.4. Neither Chambers nor 
PCUA disputes that ruling. 81 F.3d at 359 n.2. 
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       not apply when the prior position was taken because of 
       a good faith mistake rather than as part of a scheme to 
       mislead the court. An inconsistent argument sufficient 
       to invoke judicial estoppel must be attributable to 
       intentional wrongdoing. 
 
Id. at 362 (citations and internal quotations omitted). The 
reason for so limiting the doctrine is straightforward. The 
doctrine is intended for those who "act with the intent to 
play fast and loose with the courts." Id. at 365. 
 
Here, the magistrate judge wrote: 
 
       To avoid dismissal or transfer of this matter, Chambers 
       represented to the Court that it was not seeking 
       interpretation of Commissioner Dewling's 1987 
       certification of the Short-Term Agreement and 
       contingent approval of the Long-Term Agreement in a 
       manner that would obstruct the NJDEPE from 
       determining where Passaic County's solid waste should 
       go in the 1992-2002 period. Count One of the 
       Amended Complaint asks exactly that. Chambers 
       should be held bound by its representations, and the 
       Court should dismiss Count One of the Amended 
       Complaint. 
 
December 11, 1996 Report and Recommendation at 8. 
There are two problems with the magistrate judge's 
conclusion. First, on the purely technical and procedural 
level, there are no findings that Chambers intentionally 
misrepresented its position so as to "play fast and lose with 
the court." For that reason alone, grant of summary 
judgment to PCUA was improper unless we assume that 
such findings are implicit in the court's ruling. However, 
under the facts sub judice, such a finding would be clearly 
erroneous because, as we will discuss, it is not supported 
by the record. Second, and more importantly, Chambers' 
position is in response to, and totally consistent with, our 
mandate in Chambers I. 
 
The dispute over the "inconsistent" positions can be 
traced to a motion filed by PCUA in 1992 by which PCUA 
sought to dismiss Chambers' first complaint. PCUA argued, 
inter alia, that Chambers' failure to join NJDEPE as an 
indispensable party under Fed.R.Civ.P. 19 was fatal to its 
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claim. Chambers responded that NJDEPE was not an 
indispensable party because Chambers was not seeking the 
rejection or modification of any NJDEPE decision nor was 
Chambers seeking to affect NJDEPE's interest in the 
administration of its solid waste management planning 
system. The district court agreed with Chambers, found 
that NJDEPE was not an indispensable party, and 
dismissed PCUA's motion. 
 
PCUA argues that Chambers once again assured the 
magistrate judge that it was not trying to second-guess 
NJDEPE or asking the court to interfere with NJDEPE's 
regulatory jurisdiction when Chambers filed its complaint 
seeking injunctive relief based upon PCUA's alleged 
anticipatory breach. PCUA argues that Count One of the 
amended complaint, filed after remand, specifically asked 
the court to interpret the Dewling Certification and, by so 
doing, asked the district court to interfere with NJDEPE's 
regulatory function. The district court agreed and dismissed 
Count One. 
 
However, Count One does not implicate NJDEPE's 
regulatory authority. The relevant portion of Count One of 
the amended complaint provides as follows: 
 
       42. The Chambers Contract was a valid, binding 
       contract when executed. 
 
       43. As executed, the Chambers contract obligated 
       PCUA to deliver all Passaic County solid waste to the 
       Chambers landfills for the final ten years of the 
       Contract in the event no incinerator was constructed. 
 
       44. No incinerator was constructed. 
 
       45. The Dewling Certification amounted to a partial 
       approval of the Chambers Contract, such that 
       Chambers was designated as the exclusive out-of-state 
       disposal facility for Passaic County solid waste during 
       the final ten years of the Contract, and could only be 
       replaced by a suitable in-state disposal facility. 
 
       46. The parties expressly and/or impliedly assented to 
       Commissioner Dewling's modifications. 
 
       47. As modified by the Dewling Certification together 
       with the parties' express and/or implied assent, the 
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       Chambers Contract obligated PCUA to utilize 
       Chambers as the exclusive out-of-state disposal facility 
       for Passaic County solid waste for the final ten years of 
       the Contract. 
 
       48. Furthermore, as modified by the Dewling 
       Certification together with the parties' express and/or 
       implied assent, the Chambers contract obligated PCUA 
       to refrain from entering into any substitute disposal 
       contracts with any facility located outside of New 
       Jersey. 
 
       49. In breach of these contractual obligations, PCUA 
       entered into a substitute disposal contract with 
       Empire, pursuant to which PCUA agreed to dispose of 
       Passaic County solid waste at a landfill facility located 
       in Taylor, Pennsylvania, for a period of time 
       commencing December 1, 1993 through and beyond 
       2002, the final year of the Chambers Contract. 
 
       50. Starting in and around December 1, 1993, PCUA 
       began performing under the Empire Contract, and 
       accordingly ceased disposing of Passaic County solid 
       waste at the Chambers landfills as required by the 
       Chambers Contract. 
 
       51. PCUA continues to perform under the Empire 
       Contract, and upon information and belief, has no 
       intention of performing under any of the obligations set 
       forth under the Chambers Contract. 
 
       52. These actions constitute a complete breach of the 
       Chambers Contract, in that they have resulted in and 
       continue to result in a complete abrogation of PCUA's 
       duty to Chambers to dispose all Passaic County solid 
       waste at the Chambers landfills until the year 2002, 
       unless and until PCUA identifies a suitable in-state 
       facility as directed by the Dewling Certification. 
 
       53. PCUA's breach of the Chambers Contract has 
       caused and continues to cause significant economic 
       harm to Chambers, including lost profits from the 
       Chambers Contract, as well as lost profits associated 
       with contracts with other entities that Chambers has 
       foregone in the reasonable belief that PCUA intended 
 
                                29 
  
       on utilizing the substantial airspace set aside for 
       Passaic County solid waste for the final ten years of the 
       Chambers Contract. 
 
Petitioner's App. at 10-12. 
 
Thus, the essence of the averments is that the Dewling 
Certification required PCUA to identify an in-state disposal 
facility by 1992 and it approved Chambers as a contingent 
alternative in the event PCUA failed to identify an in-state 
facility. The complaint avers that PCUA was obligated to 
use Chambers as its exclusive out-of-state disposal site. 
Accordingly, Chambers asserts that PCUA breached its 
contract when it entered into a contract with Empire for 
out-of-state waste disposal. 
 
This theory of recovery simply does not interfere with 
NJDEPE's regulatory functions. Chambers is not asking for 
specific performance of its contract with PCUA and it is not 
asking that the district court declare the PCUA-Empire 
contract void or voidable. Chambers succinctly states: 
"Chambers seeks contract damages against PCUA for 
bringing about [the] substitution" of Empire for Chambers. 
Petitioner's Br. at 27. There is no inconsistency in 
Chambers' pre-remand and post-remand positions. 
Moreover, we stated as much in Chambers I. There, we 
pointed out that even though the parties to this contract 
apparently understood that it was subject to the approval 
of NJDEPE, neither party saw fit to specify their rights and 
obligations if the required approval was never obtained. We 
stated the following after noting the conditional nature of 
Commissioner Dewling's Certification: 
 
       Chambers first contends that DEP's contingent 
       approval of the plan made them the exclusive out-of- 
       state disposal facility for Passaic County waste, subject 
       only to the development of in-state alternatives. . . . 
 
       Conversely, the Authority maintains that DEP's 
       contingent approval of the plan amendment permitted 
       it to replace Chambers with any waste disposal 
       alternatives. 
 
Chambers I, 62 F.3d at 585. We then observed that the 
district court considered "the DEP's contingent plan 
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approval sufficient to justify enforcing the Chambers 
contract in the absence of DEP approval of some other 
plan." Id. at 586. However, we faulted the district court for 
not resolving the effect of the 1987 Dewling Certification 
upon the Long Term Agreement between Chambers and 
PCUA. 
 
       The court, however, did not resolve specifically whether 
       DEP's original approval in 1987 made Chambers the 
       exclusive out-of-state waste disposal company for 
       Passaic County waste after December 1, 1992, should 
       PCUA fail to develop in-state waste disposal facilities. 
       Nor did it address whether the Authority could seek a 
       DEP order authorizing it to use an alternative out-of- 
       state waste disposal facility without violating it contract 
       with Chambers. 
 
Id. We then remanded with the specific instructions set 
forth above. In doing so we specifically allowed Chambers 
"the privilege to . . . amend its complaint to enable it to 
present the case in its current status." Id ., at 589. We had 
hoped that doing so would result in the proper adjudication 
of this dispute. However, what has followed has only 
confused the matter further. Chambers exercised the 
privilege extended in our mandate and amended its 
complaint. In doing so it did nothing more than attempt to 
have the district court resolve the saga of this continuing 
contract dispute by ruling on the effect that the 1987 
Dewling Certification had on the Long Term Agreement. 
However, rather than comply with the mandate and rule 
upon the issues Chambers raised in the amended 
complaint, the district court interpreted Chambers' 
amendments as playing "fast and lose" with the court and 
applied the doctrine of judicial estoppel. That was clearly 
error. 
 
We take no position on the merits of the claim Chambers 
raises in Count One of its amended complaint. Count One 
merely requires the district court to determine the parties' 
understanding of the impact of the Dewling Certification on 
the Long Term Agreement. That is precisely what we had 
ordered in issuing our mandate, and it is precisely what the 
district court would have done had it complied with that 
mandate. 
 




Accordingly, we will grant Chambers' petition for a writ of 
mandamus, vacate the district court's order granting 
summary judgment to PCUA on Count One of Chambers' 
amended complaint; and we will remand the case once 
again, for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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Stapleton, Circuit Judge, concurring: 
 
I agree with the court that the district court's disposition 
of Count One of the Amended Complaint is inconsistent 
with the prior mandate of this court and that the record 
does not support a finding that Chambers has "played fast 
and loose" with the court. Ryand Operations, G.P. v. 
Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 358 (3d 
Cir.1996). I join the opinion of the court to the extent it is 
not inconsistent with the views expressed in my prior 
concurring opinion. Chambers Development Company, Inc. 
v. Passaic County Utilities Authorities, 62 F.3d 582, 589 (3d 
Cir. 1995). 
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